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Abstract
This paper examines how specific human capital affects labour turnover and
real wage cyclicality in a frictional labour market. I develop an equilibrium
search model with long-term contracts and imperfect monitoring of worker ef-
fort. Imperfect monitoring creates a moral hazard problem that requires firms
to pay efficiency wages. The optimal contract implies that more specific cap-
ital reduces job separation, thereby alleviating the moral hazard and increas-
ing wage stability over the business cycle. I apply this model to explain novel
stylised facts about the cyclicality of the postgraduate-undergraduate wage pre-
mium. Postgraduate degree holders experience lower cyclical variation in real
wages than those with undergraduate degrees. This effect is significant for
workers with a long tenure, but not for new hires. Moreover, postgraduates
have more specific human capital than undergraduates. Estimates reveal that
specific capital can explain the educational gaps both in labour turnover and
in real wage cyclicality.
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1 Introduction
The literature on human capital theory makes an important distinction between
general and specific human capital (Becker, 1962). General human capital does not
depreciate when a worker switches firms, whereas specific human capital is lost on
job separation. Becker suggests that a higher amount of specific human capital
should reduce incentives of firms and workers to separate and increase employment
stability. Therefore, specific human capital is key to many equilibrium search models
that have direct implications for the cyclical behaviour of employment for workers
of different skill levels (Cairo´ and Cajner, 2016; Hudomiet, 2015). So far, however,
little evidence is available on the impact of specific capital on real wage variation
over the business cycle in a frictional labour market.
In this paper, I address this question by providing an empirical framework where
firms optimally choose how aggregate shocks transmit to workers based on their
workers’ specific human capital. I solve the firm’s optimal contracting problem in
a directed search model with risk averse workers and firm commitment in the spirit
of Tsuyuhara (2016) and Lamadon (2016).1 I augment it by adding specific human
capital and aggregate shocks to matches. The optimal contract implies that a higher
amount of specific human capital reduces job separation and increases wage stability
over the business cycle. Then I apply this model to explain novel stylised facts about
the cyclicality of the postgraduate-undergraduate wage premium.
The model has several important features. First, I assume all new hires lack
some specific human capital, which they obtain through a period of learning. This
process generates some specific capital, leading to lower outside options. Second,
I assume long-term contracts between risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers.
Because of the difference in risk aversion, firms would provide insurance to workers
by equating marginal utilities across realizations of aggregate shocks, and thereby
increase wage stability (Azariadis, 1975). With this assumption, firms have an risk-
sharing motive to increase wage stability. Third, I assume job output depends on
worker effort, which is unobserved by firms. The worker is laid off if the output is
1Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type search models have been used extensively to model long-
term relationships between workers and firms. These models typically assume continual Nash wage
bargaining, which would impose transmission of productivity shocks to wages by construction. As
workers are usually risk-neutral in these models, they do not care about wage variation. Allowing
risk-aversion will make these models as complicated as mine.
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too low. As workers might shirk their effort, firms have to pay efficiency wages to
incentivize their workers to exert optimal effort. With this assumption, firms have
an incentivizing motive to reduce wage stability.
There are three key results in this study. First, a higher amount of specific human
capital increases an experienced worker’s optimal effort and reduces the probability
of job separation. After gaining specific capital, experienced workers have strong
incentives to keep their jobs longer. As these incentives increase with the level of
specific capital, experienced workers with more specific capital exert a higher effort
for their projects, and their jobs are less likely to break down.
The second result is that, under the optimal contract, wage changes track ag-
gregate productivity shocks. When aggregate productivity increases, firms promise
a higher wage next period to incentivize their workers to make a greater effort, and
vice versa if aggregate productivity decreases.
Finally, the third result is that, under some mild regularity conditions, a higher
amount of specific human capital increases wage stability of an experienced worker.
Firms face the trade-off between the risk-sharing motive and the incentivizing mo-
tive. On the one hand, as experienced workers with more specific capital have a lower
probability of job separation, they will value more about firms’ future promises, and
thus, firms’ promises become more effective in motivating workers. On the other
hand, if providing incentives for worker effort becomes increasingly costly, a higher
amount of specific capital increases an experienced worker’s effort, thereby increas-
ing firm’s marginal cost of providing incentives. As more specific capital increases
both the effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incentives, it becomes
optimal for firms to provide more insurance to workers with more specific capital.
My model helps to analyze the cyclicality of the education wage gap. In the
literature, Keane and Prasad (1993) find college graduates and noncollege workers
experience the same degree of cyclical variation in real hourly wages.2 Hoynes (2000)
compare workers at a lower education margin (High School vs. Some College) and
find similar results between males in these two groups.3 Since 1980, the employment
share held by postgraduates has doubled. By 2012 nearly 15% of the US adult
2College graduates include both undergraduates and postgraduates.
3Some College are workers with more than a high school education, and High School are workers
with a high school education and less. However, Hoynes (2000) find that males in the Some College
group are subject to less cyclical variation in annual earnings, employment and hours than males
in the High School group.
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workforce, or 40% of all college graduates, have a postgraduate degree (Lindley
and Machin, 2016). Therefore, in addition to the college-noncollege margin, I also
compare postgraduates to those with only undergraduate degrees and document a
new result: In the US, the postgraduate-undergraduate wage premium is counter-
cyclical.
To illustrate, Figure 1 plots the detrended real GDP and the postgraduate wage
premium.4 The postgraduate wage premium increases substantially during all re-
cent recessions, and its correlation with real GDP is -0.47. As I discuss further in
the empirical evidence, when real GDP goes up by 1%, the median postgraduate
wage increases by 0.34%, and the median undergraduate wage increases by 0.58%,
indicating that postgraduate wages respond less to business cycle shocks than un-
dergraduate wages.
Figure 1: Detrended Real GDP and Postgraduate Wage Premium
Source. Current Population Survey March Supplement (March CPS) 1976–2016, males, aged 26–
64. NBER dated recessions are shaded. Series are logged and detrended using a Hodrick–Prescott
(HP) filter with parameter 100.
I show that the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium is due neither to
cyclical changes in the composition of the workforce, nor to postgraduates and
undergraduates sorting into different industries and occupations. Furthermore, I find
4See Appendix A for a description of the data. Postgraduate degrees include 5 years of college
completed and more prior to 1992 and master’s, professional school and doctoral degrees after
1992.
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that the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is
significant for workers with a long tenure in a given job, but not for new hires. As
workers’ job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human capital (Altonji
and Shakotko, 1987), I argue that this phenomenon occurs because experienced
postgraduates have accumulated more specific human capital in their jobs than their
undergraduate degree-holding counterparts, and thus, they are offered contracts
with more stable wages. Since new hires have not yet built any specific capital, the
difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is small.
I provide two empirical evidence showing postgraduates have more specific capital.
First, the time needed by postgraduates to become fully competent in a new job is
twice as long as the time needed by undergraduates. Second, as more specific capital
leads to larger wage losses from exogenous job displacement, I show that percent
losses in wages for postgraduates are twice as much as those for undergraduates.
There is thus a strong complementarity between education and specific capital,
which confirms the findings in Cairo´ and Cajner (2016).
I use my model to quantify the effect of specific human capital on the edu-
cational gap in labour turnover and real wage cyclicality. In the model, specific
capital is determined by 2 parameters: the upgrading probability from a new hire
to an experienced worker and the productivity gap between them. The upgrading
probability is calculated using the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI),
which measures how long it takes new hires to be fully competent in their jobs.
The productivity gap is estimated by targeting the percent losses in wages after job
displacement from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS). Although the model is
parsimonious, it can endogenously generate the differences in both labour turnover
and real wage cyclicality across education groups, given the observed empirical dif-
ferences in specific human capital. The model also shows that, as postgraduates have
more specific capital, the gap between their starting wage and average wage is larger
than that of undergraduates, but the subsequent wage growth of postgraduates is
faster. This result extends the specific human capital hypothesis in Chapman and
Tan (1980) – that the starting wage and rate of wage growth are negatively related
– to the context of education wage gaps.
I also use my model to quantitatively evaluate two alternative explanations for
the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. The two alternative explanations
are based on differences in job profitability and hiring costs. I simulate the model
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under each of these alternative hypotheses and then use empirical evidence to dis-
criminate between them. Finally, I briefly discuss two alternatives not nested by my
model: cyclical change in relative supply and difference in risk aversion. I compare
them to the available empirical evidence and suggest that they can not provide a
reasonable explanation.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, a large literature has
studied the consumption self-insurance in the face of uncertain labour income (see
e.g. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston 2008, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
2014, and Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2012). This paper explores where income
shocks arise from in the first place and contributes to the literature on insurance
within the firm. In a competitive framework, Azariadis (1975) and Beaudry and
DiNardo (1991) argue that firms can provide employment contracts to insure work-
ers from aggregate shocks. Lagakos and Ordonez (2011) study how the role of
displacement costs for workers in determining risk sharing between workers and
firms. Lustig, Syverson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) study how the portability
of organizational capital by managers affects their compensation dynamics. To my
knowledge, the current paper is the first to quantify the impact of specific capital on
insurance against aggregate shocks within the firm in a noncompetitive framework.
Second, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature on long-term contracts
in frictional labour markets. Burdett and Coles (2003) and Shi (2009) derive the
optimal wage-tenure contracts with risk averse workers. Menzio and Shi (2011) prove
the existence of a block recursive equilibrium in directed search models. Rudanko
(2009) derive the optimal contract with two-sided lack of commitment and aggregate
shocks but without unobserved worker behaviour. Tsuyuhara (2016), Lentz (2015),
and Lamadon (2016) introduce unobserved worker behaviour and dynamic incentive
contract, but without shocks to aggregate productivity. The main contributions here
are to incorporate specific human capital and aggregate shocks, and to formally
derive the optimal wage contracts over the business cycle.
Finally, this paper contributes to the empirical literature that studies the cyclical-
ity of real wages across education groups.5 In the US, Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky
5A large literature has studied earnings risk across other observables – see, e.g., Guvenen, Ozkan
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and Parker (1994) find that estimated real wage cyclicality varies insignificantly with
worker’s years of education. Keane and Prasad (1993), Lindquist (2004), and Balleer
and Rens (2013) find no significant difference in the cyclicality of real hourly wage
between college graduates and noncollege workers. Hoynes (2000) find similar result
between workers with more than a high school education and workers with a high
school education and less. However, using 1967-1991 PSID, Swanson (2007) find
that wages of high school dropouts aged 20-29 exhibit greater pro-cyclicality than
all other groups. In the UK, Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014) show that real hourly
wages fell by about 10% for all education groups during the Great Recession, and
Delaney and Devereux (2019) find that more education lowers the pro-cyclicality of
wages. Ammermueller, Kuckulenz and Zwick (2009) find the opposite in Germany
that workers with more years of education suffer higher cyclical wage variation. In
a related but different literature, Doniger (2019) document that the user cost of
labour (allocative wage) is more pro-cyclical for college graduates than noncollege
workers. In this paper, I compare workers at a higher education margin and provide
novel empirical evidence that postgraduates experience lower cyclical variation in
real wages than undergraduates. I then use a combination of microdata and a theo-
retical model to quantitatively discriminate among several possible explanations for
the observed empirical patterns.
Outline
Section 2 provides empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the equilibrium search
model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal contract. In Section 5, I outline the
estimation strategy, discuss the identification, and report the estimation results. In
Section 6, I analyze the estimated model and report the counterfactual simulations.
Section 7 evaluates other potential explanations. Section 8 concludes.
and Song (2014) and Bloom et al. (2017) for some recent empirical evidence.
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2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 Aggregate Cyclicality
I start by showing the aggregate cyclicality of wage premium across different educa-
tion levels. Table 1 reports that the undergraduate wage is more pro-cyclical than
the postgraduate wage: when real GDP goes up by 1%, the median (mean) postgrad-
uate wage increases by 0.34% (0.25%), and the median (mean) undergraduate wage
increases by 0.58% (0.85%). Because of this, the postgraduate-undergraduate wage
premium is counter-cyclical. Table 1 also shows that both the college-noncollege
wage premium and the undergraduate-noncollege wage premium are largely acycli-
cal.6
Table 1: Elasticity with respect to GDP
Wage Wage Premium
Postgrad Undergrad Noncollege Postgrad
Undergrad
Undergrad
Noncollege
College
Noncollege
Median .34** .58*** .57*** -.24* .01 .03
(.14) (.16) (.12) (.14) (.14) (.13)
Top25% .04 .71*** .53*** -.67*** .18 -.03
(.19) (.15) (.11) (.16) (.12) (.12)
Mean .25 .85*** .50*** -.60*** .35** .12
(.18) (.17) (.12) (.18) (.15) (.13)
Notes. March CPS 1976–2016, males, aged 26–64. Wages are deflated to constant 2000 dollars.
College graduates = undergraduates + postgraduates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
2.2 Regression of Wage on Degree Interaction
I go on to use individual-level data to compare the wage cyclicality between post-
graduates and undergraduates, controlling for observed characteristics. To estimate
the effects of postgraduate degree on the wage cyclicality, I follow Keane and Prasad
(1993) and run the regression of log real hourly wage
6The undergraduate-noncollege wage premium is weakly pro-cyclical in the mean, while it is
acyclical in the median and the top 25%. As is argued by Lindquist (2004), the median wage
premium is a more suitable measure of the correlation between output and the wage premium
than the mean wage premium, because composition bias and top-coding have a smaller impact on
the median wage premium.
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lnWit = θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut +Xitβ + εit (1)
where PGit is a postgraduate degree dummy, which equals 1 if the worker has a
postgraduate degree and 0 if he only has an undergraduate degree. I use unemploy-
ment rate Ut as an indicator of the business cycle.
7 α measures the cyclicality of the
undergraduate wage. For instance, a negative estimate of α would imply that the
average real wage of undergraduates declines when the unemployment rate rises, i.e.
the undergraduate wage is pro-cyclical. The coefficient γ on the interaction term
PGit × Ut captures the difference between the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage
and the undergraduate wage, and α+γ measures the cyclicality of the postgraduate
wage. A positive estimate of γ would indicate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage
premium — the premium increases when the unemployment rate rises. Xit is a
vector of observables including state dummies, a race dummy, a marriage dummy,
a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend.
Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the estimates from regression (1). I use the 1976-2016 March CPS
and restrict the sample to males aged 26-64 not self-employed. I further restrict
the above sample to postgraduates and undergraduates only. The sample size is
364,864 individuals. Following Robin (2011), the unemployment rate is successively
log-transformed, HP-filtered and exponentiated. I HP-filter the annual series with
a conventional smoothing parameter 100. The results are robust to the detrending
method.8
The first column of Table 2 shows the regression result on log real hourly wages.
Hourly wages are computed as annual labour earnings divided by annual hours, and
are deflated to constant 2000 dollars. The estimated coefficient α on the unem-
ployment rate is -0.0124 (s.e. 0.0012), indicating that a 1 percentage point rise in
the unemployment rate causes a 1.24% decline in the real wage for undergraduates.
Thus, the undergraduate wage is strongly pro-cyclical. The estimated coefficient γ
on the interaction term PGit × Ut is 0.0086 (s.e. 0.0021), indicating that when the
7The results are not affected by the choice of the indicator of the business cycle. See the
discussion in the next section.
8I also detrend the unemployment rate using a cubic trend and obtain very similar results. See
column (2) of Table 13 in Appendix B.1.
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Table 2: Regression on Degree Interaction
Data March CPS 76-16 PSID 85-15
Method OLS FE
Dependent lnWage lnHour lnEarnings lnWage
URATE (α) -.0124*** -.0064*** -.0188*** -.0125***
(.0012) (.0007) (.0015) (.0032)
PG× URATE (γ) .0086*** .0035*** .0121*** .0120*
(.0021) (.0011) (.0024) (.0062)
α+ γ -.0038** -.0029*** -.0067*** -.0005
(.0017) (.0009) (.0019) (.0053)
Observations 364,864 12,692
Notes. Sample is males aged 26–64 not self-employed. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point in a downturn, postgraduates face
a 0.86% increase in their real wage relative to that of undergraduates. Therefore,
the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical. The sum of the coefficients
α and γ is -0.0038 (s.e. 0.0017), indicating that a 1 percentage point rise in the
unemployment rate causes a 0.38% decline in the postgraduate wage, which is less
pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage.
I also experiment with other indicators of the business cycle, such as log real
GDP. I find that when real GDP increases by 1%, the average real hourly wage for
postgraduates increases by 0.403% and that for undergraduates increases by 0.988%.
See column (1) of Table 13 in Appendix B.1 for the estimates. Column (3)-(5) of the
same table presents robustness checks, including median regression and regression
by age groups, all confirming my finding that the postgraduate wage is in fact less
pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage.9
Hours and Earnings
The second column of Table 2 provides estimates of the cyclicality of annual hours
worked. The estimation framework is identical to that used for real hourly wages
9Figure 6 in Appendix B.3 plots wage growth rates in booms and recessions. The wage growth
rates for postgraduates are relatively more stable over the business cycle than those for undergrad-
uates.
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(Equation 1). The coefficient on Ut is -0.0064 (s.e. 0.0007) and the coefficient on
PGit × Ut is 0.0035 (s.e. 0.0011). Thus, for postgraduates, annual hours worked
are less pro-cyclical than those for undergraduates. The difference in the cyclicality
of hours between undergraduates and postgraduates is smaller than that of wages.
The third column of Table 2 shows estimates of cyclicality of annual labour earnings.
When the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, the real earnings of
undergraduates fall by 1.88%, and those of postgraduates fall by 0.67%. Postgradu-
ate earnings are less pro-cyclical than undergraduate earnings. In conjunction, these
results suggest that postgraduates have more stable wages, hours, and earnings than
undergraduates.
Selection Bias
The typical selection bias problem in this type of analysis is: undergraduates are
more likely to be unemployed than postgraduates during recessions, so the rela-
tive wage of undergraduates increases mechanically. Therefore, my finding that the
postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical is not generated by selection bias,
because selection bias reduces the counter-cyclicality. Furthermore, the unemploy-
ment rates for both undergraduates and postgraduates are less than 3% (Table 6),
which illustrates the limited effect of the selection bias problem.
To eliminate such systematic selection regardless, I focus on job stayers – workers
who stayed in the same job last year, did not look for work during that period, and
worked for 52 weeks. This essentially compares average postgraduates with good
undergraduates, so the estimated coefficient should be smaller. Column (6) of Table
13 shows that the estimated coefficient γ shrinks slightly to 0.0069. To further
support my findings, I run Heckman (1979) selection model with a first-stage probit
employment equation.10 The estimates are in Column (7) of same table, which is
similar to the baseline.
10The variables included in the first-stage employment equation but excluded from wage equation
are: number of own children in the household, number of own children under age 5 in the household,
and age of youngest own child in the household.
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Industries and Occupations
Table 14 in Appendix B.2 presents the estimates from the wage regression by major
industries and occupations. This can be used to check whether this phenomenon
occurs because postgraduates and undergraduates sort into different industries and
occupations, which are subject to different cyclical shocks in productivity. I find
that the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical in all major industries and
in Managerial, Professional Specialty, Technical, and Sales occupations (added up
to 82% of all college graduates).
In addition, I also check how the coefficient γ on PGit×Ut shrinks after control-
ling for interactions between Ut and industries and occupations in Table 15 in the
same appendix. The more this coefficient shrinks, the more industries and occupa-
tions can explain the counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium. After
controlling for 43 industry dummies × 60 occupation dummies, I find that γ shrinks
from 0.0086 to 0.0059. Therefore, γ does not shrink substantially.
Individual Fixed-Effects
I also run regression 1 with individual fixed-effects controlling for a cubic age trend
and a quartic time trend. I use the 1985–2015 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and restrict the sample to male heads aged 26-64 not self-employed. The
last column of Table 2 presents the estimates. The estimated coefficient α on the
unemployment rate Ut is -0.0125 (s.e. 0.0032) indicating that a 1 percentage point
rise in the unemployment rate causes a 1.25% decline in the real hourly wage for
undergraduates.11 The estimated coefficient γ on the interaction term PGit × Ut
is 0.0120 (s.e. 0.0062) indicating that when the unemployment rate goes up by
1 percentage point, postgraduates face a 1.2% increase in their real wage relative
to that of undergraduates, which confirms that the postgraduate wage premium is
counter-cyclical.
11Using 1968-1992 PSID, Swanson (2007) regress log real hourly wage on the unemployment
rate without distinguishing education levels. He finds that a 1 percentage point rise in the unem-
ployment rate causes a 1.22% decline in the real wage, which is of the similar magnitude as my
estimates.
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2.3 Job Tenure and Specific Capital
Is there a link between counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium and job tenure?
I test for it using PSID, which is particularly advantageous here because of the
information it provides on the length of uninterrupted tenure on the current job.
I run the following fixed-effects regression of log wage on interactions between Ut,
PGit and length of tenure
lnWit = ShortTenureit × (α1Ut + γ1PGit × Ut) (2)
+ (1− ShortTenureit)× (α2Ut + γ2PGit × Ut) +Xitβ + µi + εit
where ShortTenureit is a dummy on the length of tenure, which equals 1 if the
worker has at most κ years of uninterrupted tenure on the current job and equals 0
if he has a longer tenure. µi stands for unobserved individual-specific characteristics
that are fixed over time. Xit includes a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend.
For new hires, the coefficient α1 measures the cyclicality of the undergraduate wage,
and γ1 measures the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and un-
dergraduates. α2 and γ2 are the corresponding coefficients for workers with a long
tenure.
I restrict the sample to male heads aged 26-64 not self-employed. First, following
Altonji and Williams (2005), I set ShortTenure as, at most, 1.5 years of tenure.
The estimates are presented in the Column “κ = 1.5” of Table 3. For new hires,
the estimated coefficient γ1 on the interaction term PGit × Ut has the positive sign
but is not significant. For workers with a long tenure, the estimated coefficient γ2
is significantly positive, indicating that postgraduates have smaller wage cyclicality
than undergraduates. γ2 is significantly larger than γ1 indicates that the difference
in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is higher for workers
with a long tenure than new hires. Then, in the Column “κ = 2” and κ = 2.5”, I set
ShortTenure as at most 2 years and 2.5 years of tenure respectively. The results
are not changed.
A worker’s job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human capital
(Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991). Thus, this phenomenon is consistent
with a story of specific capital: Postgraduates accumulate more specific capital
13
in their jobs than undergraduates. As new hires have not yet built any specific
capital, the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates
is small. As workers with a long tenure have accumulated specific human capital,
the difference in wage cyclicality is large.
Table 3: Fixed-effect Regressions by Job Tenure
lnWage κ = 1.5 κ = 2 κ = 2.5
ShortTenure
URATE (α1) -.0172** -.0151** -.0160***
(.0075) (.0065) (.0062)
PG× URATE (γ1) .0052 .0059 .0052
(.0068) (.0066) (.0066)
1− ShortTenure
URATE (α2) -.0118*** -.0123*** -.0122***
(.0035) (.0035) (.0036)
PG× URATE (γ2) .0111* .0114* .0118*
(.0062) (.0062) (.0062)
γ2 − γ1 .0059** .0054** .0066**
(.0030) (.0027) (.0027)
Observations 12,692
Workers 1,804
Source. PSID 1985-2015, males heads, aged 26–64, not self-employed. “κ = 1.5”: ShortTenure is
set as, at most, 1.5 years of tenure. “κ = 2”: ShortTenure is set as, at most, 2 years of tenure.
“κ = 2.5”: ShortTenure is set as, at most, 2.5 years of tenure. Controls: a cubic age trend and
a quartic time trend. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Specific Capital
In previous sections, I showed that postgraduates have more stable wages than
undergraduates over the business cycle, and that this effect is significant for work-
ers with a long tenure, but not for new hires. My theory for this phenomenon is
that postgraduates have more specific capital which reduces their wage cyclicality.
Specific capital has two dimensions: the size of the specific capital that new hires
have to build and the time needed for this process. In what follows, I show that
postgraduates have more specific capital in these two dimensions.
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Time Dimension
First, I study the time it takes to accumulate specific capital. I construct a new
measurement in a US employer survey – the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality
(MCSUI), which measures how long it takes new hires to be fully competent in their
jobs. The MCSUI was conducted between 1992 and 1994, in the middle of the time
period with which this paper is concerned. The survey asked employers a series of
specific questions about the last new employee the company hired. One of these
questions reads “How many weeks does it take the typical employee in this position
to become fully competent in it?” Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on this
measure of the time dimension of specific capital. The results show a considerable
difference between postgraduates and undergraduates: a newly hired postgraduate
needs 58.5 weeks on average to become fully competent, which is twice as long
as the time needed for a newly hired undergraduate (29.2 weeks). The difference
is significant at the one percent level. A newly hired noncollege worker needs 22.5
weeks to become fully competent, which is about 80% of the time needed for a newly
hired undergraduate. There is thus a strong complementarity between education and
specific capital, which confirms the findings in Cairo´ and Cajner (2016).12 However,
the difference between postgraduates and undergraduates is larger than that between
undergraduates and noncollege workers.
Table 4: Time Dimension of Specific Capital by Education
Education Noncollege Undergrad. Postgrad.
Weeks until competent 22.5 29.2 58.5
(.88) (2.32) (8.98)
Observations 2566 515 159
Source. MCSUI 1992-1994. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
12Cairo´ and Cajner (2016) use a measure of specific human capital from the Employment Op-
portunity Pilot Project (EOPP) in 1980 that is similar to my measure from the MCSUI. They also
find that education and specific human capital are complementary. In the EOPP, employers were
first asked about the current productivity of the last hired worker on a scale of 0 to 100 with 50
being the perceived average of an experienced worker in the position. Second, they asked about the
productivity of the last hired worker at the time of hiring on the same scale. Third, if the initial
productivity of the workers was below 50, they asked the employers about the time it took for the
last hire to reach average productivity. However, no question was asked if the initial productivity
of the last hire was at least 50 (only 14% of employers reported a value below 50). The MCSUI
data is not affected by this inconsistency, and its sample size is 5 times that of the EOPP.
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Size Dimension
With regard to the size dimension, more specific capital leads to larger wage losses
from exogenous job displacement. I examine this implication using the 1994-2008
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), which is a supplement to the CPS. The DWS
identifies displaced workers who have been separated from their employers for rea-
sons of slack work, plant closings, and abolished jobs — reasons which have been
taken by the literature to instrument for “exogenous” layoffs. The DWS records in-
formation on earnings on both the displaced and current job. I construct a sample
of male workers who were involuntarily displaced from a full-time job last year and
who were reemployed in a full-time job at the time of their interview.
In Table 5, I show the change in log wages across the current job and the dis-
placed job. The resulting statistics represent the fraction of a typical worker’s wage
that would be lost if he was exogenously removed from his current match and left
to find a new job. Percent losses in wages are significant from zero for all educa-
tion levels, showing a sizable productivity gap between new hires and experienced
workers. The percent losses in wages are significantly larger for postgraduates than
undergraduates at the ten percent level, and the difference is substantial: -0.178
for displaced postgraduates, twice as large as that for displaced undergraduates
(-0.086). The difference between undergraduates and noncollege workers is not sig-
nificant. In Section 5, by targeting the percent losses in wages for displaced workers
by education, I estimate the initial productivity gap of new hires in my model, which
is indeed higher for postgraduates than that for undergraduates.
Table 5: Wage Loss from Job Displacement by Education
Education Noncollege Undergrad. Postgrad.
E (logwt − logwt−1) -.086 -.086 -.178
(.013) (.030) (.060)
Observations 2576 543 210
Source. DWS 1994-2008, males who were involuntarily displaced from a full-time job last year and
are reemployed in a full-time job now. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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2.5 Worker Flows
Table 6 shows unemployment rates and worker flows for males aged 26-64. Post-
graduates have lower unemployment rate than undergraduates. Their job separation
rate is 0.46%, which is 50% lower than that of undergraduates. The job finding rate
of postgraduates is 24.5%, which is 7.3% lower than that of undergraduates, and the
job-to-job transition rate of postgraduates is 1.78%, which is 8.4% lower than that
of undergraduates. Thus, postgraduates have lower probabilities of job separation
than undergraduates, indicating that workers with more specific capital have lower
outside options.
Table 6: Unemployment Rates and Monthly Worker Flows
Education Postgrad. Undergrad.
Unemployment rate 2.05% 2.90%
Job separation rate 0.46% 0.69%
Job finding rate 24.5% 26.3%
Job-to-job transition rate 1.78% 1.93%
Source. Job-to-job transition rate uses Monthly CPS 1994-2014. Other variables use Monthly CPS
1979–2014. Males aged 26-64.
3 Contracting Model of Asymmetric Information
In this section, I develop an equilibrium search model with dynamic incentive con-
tracts, accumulation of specific human capital, and aggregate shocks. I use it to
evaluate the impact of specific capital on labour turnover and wage cyclicality by
education. In the model, the amount of specific capital is equal to the produc-
tivity gap between new hires and experienced workers. New hires obtain specific
capital through a period of learning. I assume risk-averse workers and risk-neutral
firms, which make long-term contracts optimal.13 Imperfect monitoring of worker
effort creates a moral hazard problem that requires firms to pay efficiency wages.
13This assumption is based on the arguments that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse than workers,
and their risk can be insured through better access to asset markets.
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Job search is directed, and the equilibrium is block-recursive, such that individu-
als’ optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of
workers.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Aggregate productivity zt evolves as a first-
order Markov chain with transition probabilities π (zt+1|zt), such that the transition
matrix Π is monotone.
Workers are characterized in terms of their education: either noncollege (NC),
undergraduate (BA), or postgraduate (PG). Workers in each education group pos-
sess a certain amount of general human capital, denoted by h ∈ {hNC , hBA, hPG}.
Let s ∈ {0, 1} denotes a worker’s level of specific human capital in the match,
where s = 1 represents an experienced worker possessing specific capital, and s = 0
represents a new hire without specific capital.
I follow the standard approach in the search literature by assuming that a firm is
a single-worker production unit. A match with an experienced worker (s = 1) could
produce yh (s, z) = yh (1, z) = hz, which is strictly increasing in education h and
aggregate shock z. New hires are initially unskilled in matches. They obtain specific
capital through a period of learning. In each period, a new hire may upgrade to an
experienced worker with probability φh.14 τh is the productivity gap between new
hires and experienced workers, i.e. yh (1, z) − yh (0, z) = τh. Note that φh and τh
depend on the education level h.
Workers are risk-averse. They are endowed with one unit of labour each pe-
riod, which they supply to firms for a wage wt. Workers cannot save or borrow
against their future income.15 Worker’s consumption each period equals his wage if
employed, or equals the unemployment benefit bh if unemployed.
Following Tsuyuhara (2016), I assume a job consists of a series of projects, one
of which is executed in each period. Employed workers exert effort et for a project
of the firm during each period. With probability r (et), the project succeeds, and
the output is yh (s, z), where the aggregate state is z and the worker is of education
14Then 1/φh yields the average duration of learning.
15A search model combing saving and long-term contracts is very complicated in a business
cycle setting, because it requires firms to post jobs depending on workers’ wealth. But this is an
interesting extension, and I will explore it in future research.
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h and skill type s. With probability 1 − r (et), the project fails, and the output is
0. If the project succeeds, the job continues in the following period, whereas the
worker is laid off and becomes unemployed if the project fails. The probability of
success r (.) is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave
function. The preference of the worker is
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
w1−γt − 1
1− γ
− c (et)
]
where he has constant relative risk aversion preference over consumption, and the
effort cost function c (.) is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly convex, and satisfies standard Inada conditions so that effort is interior.
3.2 Employment Contracts
In the beginning of each match, a risk-neutral firm offers a long-term contract to
a risk-averse worker. The contract specifies wages and recommended effort for all
continuation histories. Let xt = (st, zt) be the state of the match at period t. History
up to period t is denoted by xt = (x1, . . . , xt). Then the contract is a function
σ =
{
wt
(
xt
)
, et
(
xt
)}
for all xt
where wt is the wage and et is the recommended effort. I assume firms commit
to contract σ and that, once the employment relationship begins, the firm cannot
adjust the prespecified sequences of wages and effort.
The optimal contract depends crucially on the observability of the effort level.
If effort were observable, because of the difference in risk aversion between firms
and workers, the problem would be purely one of efficient risk sharing in which
firms would bear all the risk, offer constant wages, and prescribe constant effort
(Azariadis, 1975). I assume the level of effort et is unobserved by firms. As cost
of effort enters negatively in his utility function, the worker might shirk his effort.
Then, firms have to adjust wages to provide incentives. Thus, the moral hazard
problem requires firms to pay efficiency wages.
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3.3 Worker Effort Choice Problem
Following the recursive contracting approach in Spear and Srivastava (1987), his-
tory dependence can be summarized by introducing an additional state variable,
the promised value V , which is the expected discounted future value that the firm
promised to deliver to the worker from this period onwards. At each state (h, s, z, V ),
the firm chooses
{
w,
{
V hs′z′
}
, e
}
. Here w is the current wage,
{
V hs′z′
}
is the value
promised to the worker for each realization of aggregate state z′ and skill type s′
next period, and e is the recommended effort level.
An employed worker optimally chooses effort e prescribed by the contract. Let
Uhz be the value of unemployment for a worker of education level h at aggregate
state z. The incentive-compatibility constraint for a worker of education h and skill
type s at aggregate state z is
e ∈ argmax
eˆ
w1−γ − 1
1− γ
− c (eˆ) + β
{
r (eˆ)EszV
h
s′z′ + [1− r (eˆ)]EzU
h
z′
}
(3)
where the expected promised value next period
EszV
h
s′z′ =


EzV
h
1z′ if s = 1
Ez
[
φhV h1z′ +
(
1− φh
)
V h0z′
]
if s = 0
Here φh is the upgrading probability from a new hire to an experienced worker.
Then the necessary and sufficient condition for e to be the optimal effort is
c′ (e)
r′ (e)
= β
(
EszV
h
s′z′ − EzU
h
z′
)
(4)
Intuitively, effort is chosen to equate the marginal cost of effort with its marginal
benefit. According to this equation, there is little hope to separately identify the
convexity of c (.) and the concavity of r (.). Therefore, I normalize the probability
of success r (e) = e. Then Equation (4) becomes c′ (e) = β
(
EszV
h
s′z′ − EzU
h
z′
)
.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) have a similar setup with convex cost function of job
search effort and concave job finding probability. They normalize the cost function of
job search effort to be linear and estimate the concavity of the job finding probability.
As effort cost function c (.) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, e increases
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with the expected promised value next period EszV
h
s′z′ and decreases with the ex-
pected value of unemployment next period EzU
h
z′ . By promising a higher value next
period, the firm can extract a higher effort in the current period.
3.4 Firm Contracting Problem
I now describe the firm problem in terms of promised value. Consider the situation
faced by a firm that is matched with a worker of skill type s and education h. Let
Πh (s, z, V ) be the expected discounted profit for the firm when the aggregate state
is z and the worker is offered with a continuation value V . If the match separates,
the firm is left with zero profit. Then Πh (s, z, V ) must satisfy the following Bellman
equation:
Πh (s, z, V ) = max
w,{V h
s′z′
},e
e · yh (s, z)− w + e · βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
(5)
where the expected profit next period
EszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
=


EzΠ
h
(
1, z′, V h1z′
)
if s = 1
Ez
[
φhΠh
(
1, z′, V h1z′
)
+
(
1− φh
)
Πh
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)]
if s = 0
subject to the promise-keeping constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint
V =
w1−γ − 1
1− γ
− c (e) + β
[
eEszV
h
s′z′ + (1− e)EzU
h
z′
]
(6)
c′ (e) = β
(
EszV
h
s′z′ − EzU
h
z′
)
(7)
The promise-keeping constraint (6) requires that the firm delivers the promised
value V to the worker. By increasing future promises, the firm can increase the effort
level of its worker, and thus, increase the probability that the match continues.16
16Note that promise-keeping and incentive-compatibility restrictions may define a set that is not
convex. Then the profit function may not be concave. In this case, the solution to the dynamic
programming problem above can be improved by using lotteries (Phelan and Townsend, 1991).
However, as is argued by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), the optimal contract may not involve
the use of lotteries, because convexity of the choice set is a sufficient but not necessary condition
for concavity of the profit function. Indeed, in all my numerical computations, the profit function
turns out to be concave, making lotteries redundant. Since the objective of this section is to derive
some general properties of the optimal contracts, I will focus on the optimal program defined
above, disregarding the use of lotteries.
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The first-order conditions for firm problem are
yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= κc′′ (e) (8)
e · ∂Πh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
∂V hs′z′
+ e · wγsz + κ = 0 (9)
where κ is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint. The envelope
condition is
∂Πh (s, z, V )
∂V
= −wγsz (10)
3.5 Search Markets and Equilibrium
The meeting process between unemployed workers and vacancies is constrained by
search frictions. The labour market is organized in a set of queues indexed by (h, v),
which are the required education level and the value promised to workers in that
given queue.
Each firm chooses in which queue they want to open a vacancy with a flow cost
ηh > 0, and each unemployed worker chooses where to queue. Each sub-market is
characterized by its tightness represented by θ, which is the ratio of the number of
vacancies to the number of unemployed workers in this sub-market. The tightness
captures the fact that a high ratio of vacancies to workers will make it harder for
firms to hire. In a directed search model like the one presented here, the tightness
is queue specific. I use a standard matching function that in the sub-market with
tightness θ, a vacancy is filled with probability q (θ) = θα−1, and a worker matches
with probability µ (θ) = θα.17 Then
µ (θ) = q (θ)
α
α−1 (11)
In principle, different sub-markets could co-exist at the same time, but this does not
happen in equilibrium. Anticipating such an outcome, the equilibrium definition
specifies the labour market as a single tightness and promised value pair
(
θhz , v
h
z
)
for each aggregate productivity z and education level h. Appendix C.1 shows this
17According to Equation (24), vacancy posting cost and α is not separately identified. Therefore,
I draw from the evidence reported in Shimer (2005) and accordingly set α = 0.28.
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result.
A competitive search equilibrium is defined along the lines of Moen (1997).
Definition 1. A competitive search equilibrium consists of: for each (z, h), a value
for unemployment Uhz and a sub-market with tightness θ
h
z and promised value v
h
z =
EzV
h
0z′ , such that
1. Search offers zero profit for a firm, i.e. the free entry condition equalizes the
costs of posting a vacancy with the expected discounted profit
q
(
θhz
)
· βEzΠ
h
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)
− ηh = 0 (12)
where ηh is the vacancy posting cost, and q
(
θhz
)
is the probability of filling
a vacancy. As the worker is initially unskilled, EzΠ
h
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)
is the firm’s
expected profit when matched with a new hire in the beginning of the match.
2. No Pareto improving sub-market is possible, i.e. there does not exist a sub-
market with tightness θˆhz and promised value vˆ
h
z = EzVˆ
h
0z′ , s.t.
µ
(
θˆhz
)
Ez
(
Vˆ h0z′ − U
h
z′
)
> µ
(
θhz
)
Ez
(
V h0z′ − U
h
z′
)
(13)
q
(
θˆhz
)
· βEzΠ
h
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
> ηh (14)
3. The value for unemployment Uhz is consistent:
Uhz =
(
bh
)1−γ
− 1
1− γ
+ βEz
{
µ
(
θhz
)
V h0z′ +
[
1− µ
(
θhz
)]
Uhz′
}
(15)
4 Characterization of the Optimal Contract
4.1 Specific Capital, Effort, and Job Separation
Lemma 1. The pareto frontier Πh (s, z, V ) increases with the level of aggregate
productivity z and skill type s.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Lemma 2. Under the optimal contract, a higher amount of specific human capital
reduces the value of a new job.
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Proof. See Appendix C.3.
From Lemma 2, a higher amount of specific capital reduces a firm’s incentive to
post vacancies, leading to a decrease in the job finding rate in every sub-market,
thereby reducing the value of a worker’s outside options. This is consistent with
Becker (1962) that costs of acquiring specific capital are shared between workers
and firms.
Proposition 1. Under the optimal contract, a higher amount of specific human
capital increases an experienced worker’s optimal effort and reduces the probability
of job separation.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, in leaving their current jobs, expe-
rienced workers have to build up specific human capital again, so they have strong
incentives to keep their jobs longer. These incentives increase with the level of spe-
cific capital, as more specific capital reduces the value of a worker’s outside options
in all aggregate states. Thus, experienced workers with more specific capital exert
a higher effort for their projects, and their jobs are less likely to break down.
4.2 Wage Changes and Aggregate Shocks
Proposition 2. Under the optimal contract, wage changes track aggregate produc-
tivity shocks.
Proof. From (8) and (9) I obtain
−
e · ∂Πh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
∂V hs′z′
− e · wγsz =
yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
c′′ (e)
From envelope condition (10), I substitute the first term on the left with the
wage next period and get
wγs′z′ − w
γ
sz =
yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
e · c′′ (e)
(16)
When yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= 0, the wage will not change, i.e. ws′z′ =
wsz. Define w˜sz as the wage such that y
h (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= 0. From
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Lemma 1, EszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
increases with the level of aggregate productivity. At
the same time, as the flow output yh (s, z) is also strictly increasing in aggregate
productivity, when aggregate productivity increases, yh (s, z)+βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
becomes positive. As the effort cost function is strictly convex c′′ (e) > 0 , we have
wγs′z′ > w˜
γ
sz, and then ws′z′ > w˜sz by concavity. Therefore, the wage increases with
the level of aggregate productivity, and vice versa.
4.3 Specific Capital and Wage Stability
Next, I show that wage stability is affected by specific capital, given that firms
face the trade-off between increasing wage stability to provide insurance to workers
(risk-sharing motive) and increasing wage cyclicality to incentivize their workers
to exert the optimal effort (incentivizing motive). Assumption 1 is an additional
convexity requirement on the effort cost function, which is the sufficient condition
for Proposition 3.
Assumption 1. The marginal cost of effort is convex. In other words, the second
derivative of the effort cost function c′′ (e) increases with the level of effort.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 1, a higher amount of specific human capital
increases wage stability of an experienced worker.
Proof. The response of an experienced worker’s optimal effort to increased incentives
is
de
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − U
h
z′
) = d (c′)−1 [βEz (Vz′ − Uz′)]
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − U
h
z′
) = de
dc′ (e)
=
1
c′′ (e)
For an experienced worker, Equation (16) can be rewritten as
e× (wγ1z′ − w
γ
1z) =
de
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − U
h
z′
) × [hz + βEzΠh (1, z′, V h1z′)] (17)
The first term on the left-hand side of Equation (17) is worker’s optimal effort.
When aggregate productivity increases (decreases), firms promise a higher (lower)
wage next period to extract a higher (lower) effort in the current period. From
Proposition 1, experienced workers with more specific capital exert a higher effort,
so their projects are more likely to succeed and their jobs are less likely to break
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down. Therefore, they will value more about firms’ future promises. As firms’
promises become more effective in motivating workers, firms do not need to give
workers a lot of incentives.
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (17) is the response of e to
increased incentives. According to Assumption 1, as the level of effort increases,
this response becomes smaller, and thus, it becomes increasingly costly for firms to
provide incentives for worker effort. A higher amount of specific capital increases
an experienced worker’s effort, thereby increasing firm’s marginal cost of providing
incentives.
Firms face the trade-off between the risk-sharing motive and the incentivizing
motive. As a higher amount of specific capital increases both the effectiveness and
the marginal cost of providing incentives, it becomes optimal for firms to provide
more insurance rather than more incentives, i.e. smaller wage changes caused by
changes in aggregate productivity. Therefore, a higher amount of specific human
capital increases wage stability of an experienced worker.
5 Estimation
To be able to use the model for quantifying the effect of specific capital on wage
cyclicality, some of the model parameters are calibrated or fixed at externally es-
timated values, while others are directly estimated. I begin by describing fixed
and externally estimated parameters and then turn to parameters estimated by the
simulated method of moments.
5.1 Fixed and Externally Estimated Parameters
The parameter values that are fixed or externally estimated are listed in Table 7.
The probability of being upgraded from a new hire to an experienced worker φ
captures the time dimension of specific human capital in the model. It is calculated
using MCSUI as the inverse of the time it takes new hires to be fully competent
(Table 4).18 A period in the model is 1 month. The discount factor is consistent
18Weeks are transformed to months by multiplying 4.33, so that
φP G = 4.33/58.52 = 0.07, φBA = 4.33/29.17 = 0.15, φNC = 4.33/22.46 = 0.19
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with an annual real interest rate of 5%, which is the long term average of the 3-
month Treasury Bill in 1976-2016. I normalize the amount of general skills for
undergraduates hBA = 1.
Table 7: Exogenous Parameter Values
Description Param. Value Source
discount factor β .996 3-month Treasury Bill
general skill for BA hBA 1 Normalization
upgrading probability for a new hire
Postgraduates φPG .07 MCSUI
Undergraduates φBA .15 MCSUI
Noncollege workers φNC .19 MCSUI
5.2 Model Specification
Given the parameters above, I estimate the model using the simulated method of
moments and a parametrized model. I present the specification I use in this section.
The aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) in logs, such that
lnzt = ρzlnzt−1 + vzt where vzt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(18)
The worker’s effort cost function is
c (e) = c0
[
(1− e)−c1 − 1
]
(19)
such that c (0) = 0, lim
e→1
c (e) = ∞, c′ (.) > 0, c′′ (.) > 0, c′′′ (.) > 0.19 I assume the
vacancy posting cost and the unemployment benefit are proportional to the amount
of general skills to rule out different profitability (Pissarides, 2000)
ηh = η ∗ h (20)
bh = b ∗ h (21)
19c′ (e) = c0c1 (1− e)
−c1−1 , c′ (0) = c0c1, lim
e→1
c′ (e) = ∞. To deal with the corner solutions, I
set effort to 0 if c′ (0) < c0c1, and effort can never be 1 as the cost is infinite.
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where b can be interpreted as the unemployment insurance replacement rate. I relax
these proportionality assumptions in Section 7.1 and 7.2.
These specifications leave me with the following 12 parameters to estimate:
{ρz, σz, η, b, c0, c1, γ, τPG, τBA, τNC , hPG, hNC}
I perform my estimations using the simulated method of moments. The objective
function is minimized over all parameters. The initial productivity gap between new
hires and experienced workers τ determines the size dimension of specific human
capital in the model. To pin down {τPG, τBA, τNC}, I target the empirical data from
DWS on percent losses in wages after job displacement (Table 5).
The parameters of the aggregate productivity shock {ρz, σz} are identified by the
standard deviation and auto-correlation of log GDP. The amount of general skills
{hPG, hNC} are pinned down by the median postgraduate wage premium and the
median undergraduate-noncollege wage premium. The vacancy cost η affects the
meeting rate through firm’s free entry condition (12). The unemployment insurance
replacement rate b affects the value of unemployment, and thus, affects the proba-
bilities of starting a job, since individuals without jobs will choose where to apply
based on present value. Thus, job finding probabilities by education pin down η
and b. The parameters of the effort cost function c0 and c1 affect the average rate
at which workers lose their jobs. They are pinned down by job separation rates by
education. As GDP is only provided on a quarterly frequency, I take the quarterly
average for all monthly series. Then, I log and HP filter the data with smoothing
parameter 105 to produce business cycle statistics.20
The parameter of risk aversion γ controls how quickly changes in aggregate
productivity are transmitted into wage changes. I target it at the elasticity of median
wages with respect to GDP for undergraduates. Please note that the elasticity of
median wages for postgraduates and noncollege workers are not targeted. I leave
them as model outcomes and show that the model is successfully able to match the
non-targeted moments.
20The smoothing parameter is suggested by Shimer (2005).
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5.3 Estimation Results
Estimation is performed using the simulated method of moments. Since the model is
strongly parametrized, I choose the weighting matrix to reflect how informative each
moment should be about the parameters of interest. The default weight is chosen
to be the inverse of the level to minimize a distance in relative deviation. The com-
putation of standard errors is based on the pseudo-likelihood estimator presented in
Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) rejec-
tion sampling, I can perform the estimation without having to compute derivatives
and still obtain standard errors on the parameters.
The parameter estimates are displayed in Table 8. The monthly aggregate pro-
ductivity shock has a persistence of 0.985. The standard deviation of the shock to
the aggregate productivity is 0.0052. The vacancy posting cost is 7.324. The unem-
ployment insurance replacement rate is 0.557. The level and the curvature of effort
cost are 0.157 and 0.096 respectively. The risk aversion parameter is 1.116. The
initial productivity gap for undergraduates is 0.173, which is 35% of that for post-
graduates. The initial productivity gap for noncollege workers is 0.137. The amount
of general human capital for noncollege workers is 0.682 and for postgraduates is
1.222.
The fitted moments in the data and their model simulations are shown in the
columns “Data” and “Baseline” of Table 9. The model fits the moments quite well.
One success of the model is that it can capture the turnover rates between post-
graduates and undergraduates: undergraduates have higher probabilities both in
job finding and job separation compared to postgraduates, and the relative differ-
ences are generally accurate. The job separation rate for noncollege workers is lower
than its counterpart in the US. This is because, in this model, the probability of
job separation is affected by worker effort. This suggests that the estimation might
benefit from making the parameters for the effort cost function heterogeneous across
education levels. On the other hand, there are many other factors that might lead
to higher job separation for noncollege workers, and thus, imposing an exogenous
job separation rate would move the fit in the right direction.
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates
Parameters Value s.e.
Persistence of aggregate productivity ρz .985 .0056
Std. of shock to aggregate productivity σz .0052 .0019
Vacancy posting cost η 7.324 2.022
Unemployment insurance replacement rate b .557 .077
Level of effort cost c0 .157 .048
Curvature of effort cost c1 .096 .024
Risk aversion γ 1.116 .028
Initial productivity gap
Postgraduate τPG .498 .065
Undergraduate τBA .173 .051
Noncollege τNC .137 .053
Formal human capital
Postgraduate hPG 1.222 .041
Noncollege hNC .682 .061
Note. The computation of standard errors is based on the pseudo-likelihood estimator
presented in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).
6 Analysis
6.1 Cyclical Properties of Wages and Wage Premium
Table 10 shows the cyclicality of wages and wage premium in the data and their
model simulations. Please note only the wage cyclicality for undergraduates is tar-
geted in the estimation; the wage cyclicalities for postgraduates and noncollege
workers are not targeted.
Overall, the model correctly captures the cyclicality of wages and wage premium:
The undergraduate wage is more pro-cyclical than the postgraduate wage, and is
about the same as the noncollege wage. The postgraduate wage premium is counter-
cyclical; the undergraduate wage premium is acyclical. The elasticity of median
postgraduate wage premium to GDP is -0.258, and the elasticity of undergraduate
wage premium is 0.006, which are about the same size as the data.
Figure 2 plots the GDP and wages simulated from the model. The dotted line
is the GDP, the solid line is the postgraduate wage, and the dashed line is the un-
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Table 9: Model Fit (Targeted Moments)
Moments Data Baseline
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .005
Job finding rate .245 .248
Percent wage losses after displacement -.178 -.176
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .007 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263
Percent wage losses after displacement -.086 -.089
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58
Noncollege workers
Job separation rate .016 .009
Job finding rate .272 .265
Percent wage losses after displacement -.086 -.086
Common moments
Median postgraduate wage premium 1.23 1.219
Median undergraduate wage premium 1.47 1.466
std [GDP ] .024 .024
autocorr [GDP ] .954 .955
dergraduate wage. As each series is logged and demeaned, it shows the percentage
deviation from the mean. It shows that both the postgraduate wage and the under-
graduate wage are pro-cyclical, but the postgraduate wage fluctuates less than the
undergraduate wage. Therefore, the model picks up the fact that the postgraduate
wage is more stable than the undergraduate wage over the business cycle.
6.2 Impact of Specific Capital on Labour Turnover andWage
Cyclicality
To examine the importance of specific capital on labour turnover and wage cyclical-
ity, I run a counterfactual simulation where postgraduates have the same low level
of specific capital as undergraduates: the upgrading probability φ is increased from
0.07 to 0.15, and the initial productivity gap τ is reduced from 0.498 to 0.173. I
report the simulation results in the column “Low Capital” of Table 11.
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Table 10: Cyclicality of Wages and Wage Premium
Moments Type Data Baseline
Elasticity of median wage to GDP
Postgraduates Non-targeted .34 .322
Undergraduates Targeted .58 .58
Noncollege workers Non-targeted .57 .574
Elasticity of median wage premium to GDP
Postgraduate wage premium (wPG/wBA) Non-targeted -.24 -.258
Undergrad. wage premium (wBA/wNC) Non-targeted .01 .006
Note. Non-targeted moments are not targeted in the estimation.
Figure 2: Demeaned Log GDP and Log Wages by Education
The first row of column “Low Capital” shows that, when postgraduates have
lower specific capital, the job separation rate increases from 0.005 to 0.01. As
there is less to lose if they move to a new job, they exert a lower effort for their
projects, and their jobs are more likely to break down. An increase in the upgrading
probability and a decrease in the initial productivity gap increase the value of a new
job. Consequently, firms have a greater incentive to post vacancies. In the second
row of “Low Capital”, the job finding rate of the postgraduates increases from 0.248
to 0.265. Hence, when holding the same level of specific capital, postgraduates and
undergraduates have the same level of labour market turnover rates.
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Table 11: Low Level of Specific Capital for Postgraduates
Moments Baseline Low Capital
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .010
Job finding rate .248 .265
Percent wage losses after displacement -.176 -.083
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .322 .599
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .009 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263
Percent wage losses after displacement -.089 -.089
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58
Postgraduate wage premium (wPG/wBA)
Median 1.219 1.222
Elasticity to GDP -.258 .018
Note. Baseline: baseline calibration; Low Capital: Postgraduates have the same low level of specific
capital as undergraduates.
The 4th row of “Low Capital” shows that when postgraduates have lower spe-
cific capital, the wage elasticity to GDP increases from 0.322 to 0.599, indicating
that, relative to the baseline simulation, the postgraduate wage fluctuates more over
the business cycle and is as cyclical as the undergraduate wage. In the last row of
“Low Capital”, the elasticity of postgraduate wage premium to GDP changes from
-0.258 to 0.018, i.e. the postgraduate wage premium changes from counter-cyclical
to acyclical. So once holding the level of specific capital equal, the model gener-
ates same wage cyclicality across education groups. This result shows that specific
capital explains the difference in the wage cyclicality between postgraduates and
undergraduates.
Figure 3 compares log median wages with different levels of specific capital. The
solid line is the log median wage of postgraduates in the baseline simulation, the
dashed line is the log median wage of postgraduates in the “Low Capital” simulation,
and the dotted line is the log median wage of undergraduates in the baseline. First,
in comparing educations levels, postgraduate wages are higher than undergraduate
wages. When I compare within postgraduate wages, the postgraduate wage in the
baseline is more stable than that in the “Low Capital” simulation, which is also the
result of Proposition 3. The postgraduate wage in the “Low Capital” simulation
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fluctuates as much as the undergraduate wage in the baseline. Interestingly, in
Figure 3, the postgraduate wage in the “Low Capital” simulation is higher than
that in the baseline simulation. Thus, a low level of specific capital shifts the
postgraduate wage up. In the penultimate row of column “Low Capital” of Table
11, the postgraduate wage premium increases from 1.219 to 1.222. Therefore, when I
hold the level of specific capital equal, the postgraduate wage premium increases. As
postgraduates have more specific capital than undergraduates, they accept relatively
lower wages, leading to a smaller wage premium in the baseline.
Figure 3: Effect of Specific Capital on Wage Cyclicality
6.3 Wage-tenure Profiles
Different levels of specific capital also have different implications for wage-tenure
profiles. These implications can be summarized by plotting the wage-tenure profiles
by education, which are displayed in Figure 4. The solid line depicts the postgradu-
ate wage against current job tenure, and the dashed line depicts the undergraduate
wage. As each series is logged and demeaned, the results show the percentage devia-
tion from the mean. For both education groups, the wage-tenure profiles are upward
sloping. The gap between the starting wage of postgraduates and their average wage
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is greater than that of undergraduates.21 This can also be seen in the column “Base-
line” of Table 11, where the percent wage loss after displacement for postgraduates
is -0.176, and that for undergraduates is about -0.089. The third row of column
“Low Capital” of Table 11 shows that when postgraduates have the same low level
of specific capital as undergraduates, the immediate wage loss after displacement
changes from -0.176 to -0.083, which is almost the same to undergraduates.
Figure 4 also shows that wage growth is rapid during the early stage of employ-
ment, and is faster for postgraduates than that for undergraduates. In fact, the
first year of job tenure raises the postgraduate wage by 7 percent and the under-
graduate wage by 5 percent, and the first 10 years (120 months) of job tenure raise
the postgraduate wage by 21 percent and the undergraduate wage by 11 percent.22
Hence, as postgraduates have more specific capital, their starting wage on a new job
is relatively low, but their subsequent wage growth is faster.
Figure 4: Compare Wage-tenure Profiles by Education
21The starting wage is the wage of the first month of the new job.
22Topel (1991) estimates that 10 years of job tenure raise the wage by 25%. Altonji and Williams
(2005) place the tenure effect on wages at 11% per decade.
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7 Evaluating Other Potential Explanations
This section evaluates the plausibility of other potential explanations for the counter-
cyclical postgraduate wage premium. In particular, I use my model to evaluate two
alternative explanations that are based on differences in job profitability and hiring
costs. I simulate the model under each of these alternative hypotheses and then
confront the obtained simulation results with empirical evidence.
7.1 Differences in the Profitability of Jobs
A possible explanation for why postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage shocks
than their undergraduate counterparts might be related to the higher profitability
of their jobs. In the terminology of search models, postgraduates might have a lower
unemployment insurance replacement rate. In my baseline simulation, I ruled out
this possibility by assuming the proportionality between the unemployment benefit
and the amount of general skills across education groups in Equation (21).
Here I relax the proportionality assumption between postgraduates and under-
graduates. To test this hypothesis, I first assign postgraduates and undergraduates
the same level of specific capital. Then, instead of assuming the unemployment
benefit for postgraduates as bPG = b ∗ hPG = 0.557 ∗ 1.222 = 0.681, I search for the
value of bPG that generates the empirical elasticity of postgraduate wage to GDP.
I find bPG = 0.172, which is smaller than that in the baseline. The simulation re-
sults, reported in the column “Profit” of Table 12, indicate that postgraduates have
less wage cyclicality than undergraduates. However, the model now counterfactually
predicts higher job finding rates for postgraduates than undergraduates. Intuitively,
since postgraduate jobs yield higher profit, firms are willing to post more vacancies in
this segment of the labour market, leading in turn to higher labour market tightness
and job finding rates.
7.2 Differences in Hiring Costs
Another possible explanation might be that postgraduates have higher hiring costs.
In my baseline simulation, I already assumed that the vacancy posting cost grew
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Table 12: Other Potential Explanations
Moments Data Baseline Profit Hiring
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .005 .005 .004
Job finding rate .245 .248 .351 .099
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .34 .322 .34 .34
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .009 .009 .009 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263 .263 .263
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58 .58 .58
proportionally with the amount of general skills in Equation (20). However, it
might understate the true differences in hiring costs between postgraduates and
undergraduates.
I assign postgraduates and undergraduates the same level of specific capital. I
search for the value of ηPG that generates the empirical postgraduate wage elasticity
instead of assuming proportionality, i.e. ηPG = η∗hPG = 7.324∗1.222 = 8.95. I find
ηPG = 516, which is much larger than that in the baseline. The simulation results,
reported in the column “Hiring” of Table 12, indicate that postgraduates have less
wage cyclicality than undergraduates. However, the model now counterfactually
predicts much lower job finding rates for postgraduates than the data predict. Intu-
itively, since it is more costly to hire postgraduates, firms will post fewer vacancies
in this labour market segments. As a result, their job finding rates drop.
7.3 Other Alternative Explanations
The model presented in this paper cannot be used to quantitatively examine all
alternative explanations for counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. Here I
briefly discuss some alternatives not nested by my model and compare them to the
available empirical evidence.
Relative Supply One possibility for why the postgraduate wage premium is
counter-cyclical is that the relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates de-
clines in recessions, and thus, the postgraduate wage increases relative to the un-
dergraduate wage. Therefore, I test whether the relative supply of postgraduates
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to undergraduates is pro-cyclical. Figure 5 plot the detrended real GDP and the
relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates. The relative supply of postgrad-
uates to undergraduates increases in all of the recessions except the recent Great
Recession, and its correlation with real GDP is -0.32, indicating that the relative
supply of postgraduates to undergraduates is largely counter-cyclical.
Figure 5: Detrended Real GDP and the Relative Supply of PG to BA
Notes. March CPS 1976–2016, males, aged 26–64. NBER recessions are shaded. Series are logged
and detrended using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with parameter 100.
Risk Aversion Is it because postgraduates are more risk averse than undergrad-
uates, so they self-select into jobs with more stable wages? I test for this argument
using the 1992-2014 US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and restricting the
sample to males aged 50-64. On entering the study, each HRS respondent is asked
the following question: “Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family,
and you have a good job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every
year for life. You are given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job,
with a 50-50 chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it
will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job?” Depend-
ing on how they answer, respondents are then asked about jobs that give a 50-50
chance of doubling income or of cutting it by 20 percent or 50 percent. Following
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Schulhofer-wohl (2011), I classify those who reject any risky job as having high risk
aversion (risk aversion = 1), and those who accept any risky job as having low risk
aversion (risk aversion = 0). The mean of this binary variable is 0.52 for both the
postgraduates and undergraduates, i.e. 48% reject even the job that might cut in-
come by 20 percent. It shows undergraduates and postgraduates share the same
level of risk aversion.
8 Conclusion
I document a new result: in the US, the postgraduate wage premium is counter-
cyclical — postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage variation than undergraduates.
I further document that the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates
and undergraduates is significant for workers with a long job tenure, but not for
new hires. As workers’ job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human
capital, I argue that this phenomenon occurs because postgraduates accumulate
more specific capital than undergraduates. I provide robust empirical evidence that
is consistent with the theory: 1) Postgraduates need a longer time to become fully
competent in a new job than undergraduates; 2) Postgraduates suffer larger wage
losses from job displacement.
To understand how specific capital affects labour turnover and wage cyclicality,
I develop an equilibrium search model with risk averse workers and imperfect mon-
itoring of worker effort. Imperfect monitoring creates a moral hazard problem that
requires firms to pay efficiency wages. Firms face the trade-off between increasing
wage stability to provide insurance to workers and increasing wage cyclicality to
incentivize their workers to exert the optimal effort. The theoretical implication of
the model is that more specific capital leads to lower probability of job separation,
thereby increasing both the effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incen-
tives for worker effort. Then it is optimal for firms to provide more insurance rather
than more incentives. Therefore, more specific capital leads to more stable wages.
I quantify the level of specific human capital by education in the data and use
it to parameterize my model. The model can capture differences in wage cyclicality
and labour turnover between education groups, indicating that specific capital can
be an important driving force.
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A Additional Details on Data
A.1 Current Population Survey (CPS)
March CPS. The CPS is designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional
population. The survey interviews about 60,000 households at a monthly frequency.
In march every year the CPS fields the Annual Social and Economic supplement
(March CPS), which collects detailed demographic data for each household member
and labor force and income information for each household member age 15 or older.
I use the March CPS data prepared by IPUMS (https://cps.ipums.org/cps/), which
are available at the state level starting in 1976. Labor force and income information
correspond to the previous year. I use the March supplement weights to produce
my estimates on wage cyclicality.
Here I describe the details of my sample selection, which broadly follows sug-
gestions by Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010): I start by dropping individuals
with negative or zero weights. Next I drop individuals with positive earnings but
zero weeks worked. Next I drop individuals whose hourly wage is less than half the
legal minimum in that year. Then I select individuals who work at least 260 hours
during the year. To show the aggregate cyclicality of postgraduate wage premium,
I restrict the sample to males aged 26-64 in Table 1. To estimate the effects of
postgraduate degree on the wage cyclicality controlling for observed characteristics,
I further restrict the sample to workers not self-employed in Table 2.
Next I describe the selection of variables. For education groups, I use the IPUMS
variable EDUC which is a combination of two other variables, HIGRADE and
EDUC99. HIGRADE is available for years prior to 1992 and gives the respon-
dent’s highest grade of school or year of college completed. EDUC99 is available
beginning in 1992 and classifies high school graduates according to their highest
degree or diploma attained. My education groups consist of: i) noncollege work-
ers (3 years of college completed and less according to HIGRADE; some college /
associate’s degree and less according to EDUC99); ii) college graduates (4 years of
college completed according to HIGRADE; bachelor’s degree according to EDUC99);
iii) postgraduates (5 years of college completed and more according to HIGRADE;
master’s, professional school and doctoral degrees according to EDUC99).
Over the years, there are changes in the occupation/industry classifications in
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the CPS. I use IPUMS variable OCC90LY and IND90LY for occupation/industry
classifications, which recodes information into the 1990 Census Bureau classification
system and provides consistent codes for the jobs respondents reported working last
year.
Recall that I compute an individual’s wage as annual earnings divided by annual
hours worked. To compute hours worked last year, I multiply the IPUMS variable
WKSWORK1 (weeks worked last year) by UHRSWORKLY (usual hours worked
per week last year). In Table 2, earnings is labour income. For years prior to 1988,
labour income = INCWAGE. Beginning in 1988, labour income = INCLONGJ
(if SRCEARN = 1) + OINCWAGE. Here INCWAGE = income from wage and
salary; INCLONGJ = earnings from longest job before deductions; OINCWAGE
= income from other wage and salary; SRCEARN = 1 indicates source of earn-
ings from longest job is wage and salary. As the sample in Table 1 includes self-
employed workers, I follow Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) and use labor
income plus 2/3 self-employment income. For years prior to 1988, self-employment
income = INCBUS + INCFARM. Beginning in 1988, self-employment income =
INCLONGJ (if SRCEARN = 2 or 3) + OINCBUS + OINCFARM. Here INCBUS
= income from non-farm self-employment; INCFARM = income from farm or non-
incorporated self-employment; OINCBUS = income from other work included busi-
ness self-employment income; OINCFARM = income from other work included farm
self-employment income; SRCEARN = 2 or 3 indicates source of earnings from farm
or non-farm self-employment.
In the CPS, top-code thresholds vary widely across income categories, and across
time. Following Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010), I deal with top-coded obser-
vations by assuming the underlying distribution for each component of income is
Pareto, and forecast the mean value for top-coded observations by extrapolating a
Pareto density fitted to the non-top-coded upper end of the observed distribution.
Monthly CPS. In addition to the March CPS, I merge monthly CPS data to
create a short panel. Specifically, I use the code by Robert Shimer23, combined
with monthly CPS files downloaded from NBER24. See Shimer (2012) for a further
discussion of the issues involved in linking individuals across months in the monthly
23https://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows
24http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html
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CPS files. The short panel allows me to estimate job separation rate and job finding
rate from 1979-2014. Since the introduction of dependent interviewing techniques
with the 1994 redesign of the CPS, the survey asks whether an employed worker
works for the same employer as last month. I use this fact to estimate the job-to-job
transition rate from 1994–2014. I use the provided monthly CPS weight.
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) The DWS is a supplement to the CPS
administered in the January or February of every even year. The DWS identifies
displaced workers who have been separated from their employers due to (i) insuffi-
cient demand for the worker’s services, (ii) the worker’s position being abolished, or
(iii) the worker’s plant closing — reasons which have been taken by the literature
to instrument for “exogenous” layoffs. The DWS inherits the large sample size and
representative structure of the CPS and also records information on earnings on
both the displaced and current job.
A.2 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
The PSID is a longitudinal study of US households and individuals. The origi-
nal 1968 sample was drawn from two independent sub-samples: an over-sample of
roughly 2000 poor families selected from the Survey of Economic Opportunities
(SEO), and a nationally representative sample of roughly 3000 families designed by
the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan. In 1997, the SEO
sample was reduced by one-half. In 1990, PSID added 2000 Latino households, in-
cluding families originally from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. While this sample
(the so-called “Latino sample”) did represent three major groups of immigrants, it
missed out on the full range of post-1968 immigrants, Asians in particular. Because
of this crucial shortcoming, and a lack of sufficient funding, the Latino sample was
dropped after 1995. A sample of 441 immigrant families, including Asians, was
added in 1997 (the so-called “Immigrant sample”).
Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed individuals from families in the initial
samples. Adults have been followed as they have grown older, and children have
been observed as they have advanced into adulthood, forming family units of their
own (the “split-offs”). Survey waves are annual from 1968 to 1997, and biennial
since then. Although the PSID provides a wide variety of information about all
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individuals in the family unit, the greatest level of detail is ascertained for the
primary adult in the family unit, i.e., the head25. In the PSID all the questions
are retrospective, i.e., variables in survey-year t refer to calendar year t − 1. The
interview is usually conducted around March.
I base my empirical analysis on the SRC sample. I use all the yearly surveys
from 1985–1996 and the biennial surveys from 1997-2015. I start in 1985 because
the variable on highest degree received is available only since 198526. I restrict
the sample to male heads aged 26 to 64 who were not self-employed, and I only
use the first spell I observe someone as a head. Wages are annual hourly wages
(annual labour earnings divided by annual hours). Nominal wages are deflated by
the Consumer Price Index. The base year is 2000. I also restrict the sample to
hourly wage less than or equal to $100. Workers whose hourly wage rate was below
$1 (in 2000 dollars) or less than half of the corresponding federal minimum wage
in that year are viewed as non-employed. I create consistent measure of age: I
determine the age in the first year the respondent was a head, and then increment
age by 1 for each subsequent year the respondent was a head.
A.3 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequalities (MCSUI)
The MCSUI was collected in four large US cities (Los Angeles, Boston, Detroit and
Atlanta) between 1992 and 1994. It aims to understand why high rates of joblessness
have persisted among minorities living in America’s central cities. One important
aspect of the study was the contacting of more than 3000 employers to ask detailed
questions about their hiring practices. Even though the intent of the study was
to understand racial discrimination in hiring, the exhaustive information about the
recruitment process makes this study valuable for broader purposes. The sampling
25The head of the family unit (FU) must be at least 16 years old, and the person with the most
financial responsibility in the FU. If this person is female and she has a husband in the FU, then
he is designated as head. If she has a boyfriend with whom she has been living for at least one
year, then he is head. However, if she has 1) a husband or a boyfriend who is incapacitated and
unable to fulfill the functions of head, 2) a boyfriend who has been living in the FU for less than a
year, 3) no husband/boyfriend, then the FU will have a female head. A new head is selected if last
year’s head moved out of the household unit, died or became incapacitated, or if a single female
head has gotten married. Also, if the family is a split-off family (hence a new family unit in the
sample), then a new head is chosen.
26Although individual’s years of education is available before 1985, almost no one has more than
16 years of education before 1983 in my sample, which is not useful for the analysis of postgraduates.
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procedure and the provided weights intend to represent employees who worked in
the 4 cities in 1992. A subsection of the survey asked employers about their most
recently hired worker. One of the questions is “How many weeks does it take the
typical employee in this position to become fully competent in it?” I use it to analyze
the duration of learning by education in this paper.
A.4 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The HRS is a national longitudinal study of Americans aged 50 or older. It begun
in 1992 and designed to investigate health and economic consequences of older in-
dividuals as they advance from work to retirement. It also includes experimental
questions that give evidence on respondents’ preferences. The original HRS cohort
consisted of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses. A sample
of individuals born before 1923 was added soon thereafter. An additional sample of
individuals born between 1923 and 1930 was added in 1998. Baseline surveys were
conducted face-to-face. Follow-up interviews were completed by telephone or mail.
The HRS has been repeated every 2 years since 1992, and data between 1992 and
2014 are used in this study.
B Additional Details on Empirical Facts
B.1 Robustness Check of Regression (1)
GDP as an Indicator of the Business Cycle
Instead of the unemployment rate, I use log real GDP as an indicator of the business
cycle and run the following regression
lnWit = θPGit + α lnGDPt + γPGit × lnGDPt +Xitβ + εit
α indicates the relation between the undergraduate wage and GDP. For instance, a
positive estimate of α would imply that the average real wage of undergraduates in-
creases when GDP rises, i.e. the undergraduate wage is pro-cyclical. The coefficients
γ captures the difference between the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage and the
undergraduate wage, and α + γ indicates the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage.
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A negative estimate of γ would indicate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage pre-
mium — the premium decreases when GDP rises. The estimates are in column (1)
of Table 13. It shows that when real GDP increases by 1%, the postgraduate wage
increases by 0.403% and the undergraduate wage increases by 0.988%, confirming
the finding that the postgraduate wage is less pro-cyclical than the undergraduate
wage.
Table 13: Robustness – Regression of Real Hourly Wage on Degree Interaction
(1)
lnWage lnGDP
lnGDP (α) .988***
(.074)
PG× lnGDP (γ) -.584***
(.119)
α+ γ .403***
(.094)
(2) (3) (4)
lnWage Cubic Detrend Median 26˜40
URATE (α) -.0105*** -.0099*** -.0157***
(.0011) (.0013) (.0016)
PG× URATE (γ) .0064*** .0074*** .0086***
(.0017) (.0021) (.0029)
α+ γ -.0041*** -.0026 -.0071***
(.0014) (.0017) (.0024)
(5) (6) (7)
lnWage 41˜64 Job Stayers Heckman
URATE (α) -.0094*** -.0106*** -.0121***
(0019) (.0013) (.0012)
PG× URATE (γ) .0070** .0069*** .0084***
(.0029) (.0022) (.0021)
α+ γ -.0023 -.0037** -.0037**
(.0023) (.0018) (.0017)
Notes. (1) Use Log real GDP as an indicator of the business cycle; (2) Unemployment rate is
detrended by a cubic trend; (3) Median regression; (4) Aged 26˜40; (5) Aged 41˜64; (6) Workers
had only 1 employer, no stretch of looking for work, and worked for 52 weeks; (7) Heckman
selection model with first-stage employment choice. Controls: postgraduate degree, state, race,
and marriage dummies, a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Cubic Detrending, Median Regression, and Age Groups
In column (2) of Table 13, I detrend the aggregate unemployment rate using a cubic
time trend and find that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage
point, postgraduates face a 0.64% increase in their real wage relative to that of
undergraduates. In column (3), I run a median regression and find that when the
unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, the median wage of postgraduates
increases by 0.74% relative to that of undergraduates. In column (4) and (5), I cut
the baseline sample into 2 age groups. I find that when the unemployment rate
goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates aged 26-40 face a 0.86% wage increase
relative to undergraduates in the same age group, and postgraduates aged 41-64
face a 0.70% relative wage increase. So having a postgraduate degree significantly
reduces wage cyclicality for both age groups.
Job Stayers and Heckman Selection Model
A typical selection bias problem is that undergraduates are more likely to be un-
employed than postgraduates in recessions, so the average undergraduate wage in-
creases mechanically relative to the average postgraduate wage. To eliminate such
systematic selection, I run the regression (1) with only job stayers – workers who
stayed in the same job last year, had no stretch of looking for work, and worked for
52 weeks. Column (6) of Table 13 shows that the coefficient γ on PGit×Ut shrinks
slightly to 0.0069 (s.e. 0.0022). Therefore, job separation can only explain a small
amount of the counter-cyclical postgraduate premium.
Besides, I use a maximum likelihood version of Heckman (1979) selection model.
This model estimates a wage equation jointly with probit choice equation that de-
termines whether a worker is employed. The model is written as follows:
lnWit =θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut +Xitβ + εit,
observed iff Pit = 1,
where P ∗it =δPGit + δUt + ηPGit × Ut + Zitβ0 + ωit,
Pit =


1 if P ∗it ≥ 0
0 if P ∗it < 0
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Here P ∗it is the latent index of a probit employment equation that determines whether
worker i is employed at time t. Zit is a vector of individual-specific regressors that
affect the probability of employment. Typically, it contains elements that enter into
Xit as well as some additional variables that may affect labour supply propensity
but not worker productivity. The additional variables are: number of own children
in the household, number of own children under age 5 in the household, and age
of youngest own child in the household. The error terms εit and ωit are assumed
to have a bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ and respective standard
deviations σǫ and 1. The latter variance is normalized to one for identification of the
probit choice equation. Column (7) of Table 13 presents the estimates that when
the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates face a 0.84%
wage increase relative to undergraduates, which is similar to the baseline.
B.2 Regressions by Industries and Occupations
Does this phenomenon occur because postgraduates and undergraduates sort into
different industries and occupations that are subject to different cyclical variation
in productivity? To test whether this argument holds, I run the wage equation at
the industry and occupation level. Table 14 presents the estimates. I find that
the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical in all major industries and in
Managerial, Professional Specialty, Technical, and Sales occupations (added up to
82% of all college graduates).
Importance of Occupations and Industries
Next, I check whether the different wage cyclicality of occupations and industries
are important determinants of the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. In
order for this argument hold, occupations and industries must be strong predictors
of counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. To test this condition, I run the
following regression
lnWit =
J∑
j=1
(κjIijt + αjIijt × Ut) + γPGit × Ut + θPGit +Xiβ + εit (22)
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Table 14: Wage Regression at the Industry/Occupation Level
lnWage URATE PG*URATE BAI+PGI∑
I
BAI+PGI
PGI∑
I
PGI
PGI
BAI+PGI
by Industry
Nondurable Mfg. -.0121*** .0163*** 5.95% 4.63% 29.76%
(.0039) (.0026)
Durable Mfg. -.0152*** .0126*** 11.51% 9.69% 32.25%
(.0026) (.0023)
T.C.U -.0080** .0103*** 7.25% 4.40% 23.23%
(.0036) (.0025)
F.I.R -.0186*** .0101*** 9.54% 7.17% 28.79%
(.0034) (.0025)
Services -.0139*** .0082*** 40.79% 56.72% 53.26%
(.0019) (.0021)
Trade -.0151*** .0047** 11.79% 5.97% 19.40%
(.0032) (.0026)
Public Admin. -.0018 .0066*** 8.48% 8.59% 38.78%
(.0026) (.0022)
A.M.C .0005 .0122*** 4.69% 2.84% 23.15%
(.0047) (.0029)
by Occupation
Managerial -.0125*** .0110*** 29.07% 27.94% 36.81%
(.0019) (.0021)
Professional -.0131*** .0087*** 36.35% 53.56% 56.44%
(.0019) (.0021)
Technical -.0087** .0056** 5.48% 4.47% 31.29%
(.0037) (.0025)
Sales -.0121*** .0065** 11.06% 5.32% 18.44%
(.0034) (.0026)
Service & Admin. -.0105*** .0006 9.98% 5.29% 20.30%
(.0029) (.0025)
P.C.R -.0126*** .0007 4.13% 1.71% 15.88%
(.0044) (.0031)
O.F.L -.0067 -.0071** 3.94% 1.70% 16.53%
(.0049) (.0033)
Notes. BAI +P GI∑
I
BAI +P GI
: the proportion of Industry/Occupation I among all college graduates
(PG+BA). P GI∑
I
P GI
: the proportion of Industry/Occupation I among all postgraduates. P GI
BAI +P GI
:
the ratio of postgraduates to college graduates in Industry/Occupation I. T.C.U: Transportation,
Communications and Utilities. F.I.R: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. A.M.C: Agriculture,
Mining and Construction. P.C.R: Precision production, Craft and Repair. O.F.L: Operators,
Fabricators and Labourers.
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where Iijt = 1 if worker i locates in industry or occupation j at time t. Iijt is
interacted with the unemployment rate. The interesting question is by how much
coefficient γ shrinks after I control for the interaction between the unemployment
rate and Iijt. The more it shrinks, the more industries and occupations can explain,
in a regression sense, the counter-cyclicality postgraduate wage premium. Table 15
shows the regression results. Column (1) shows the baseline without controlling for
industries or occupations. When I control for 43 industry dummies in Column (2),
the coefficient γ on PGit×Ut shrinks slightly from 0.0086 to 0.0078. When I control
for 60 occupation dummies in Column (3), the coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0063. In
Column (4), I include industry dummies × occupation dummies, and the coefficient
γ shrinks from 0.0086 to 0.0059.
Table 15: Controlling for interaction between the unemployment rate and Iijt
lnWage (1) (2) (3) (4)
URATE -.0124***
(.0012)
PG× URATE .0086*** .0078*** .0063*** .0059***
(.0021) (.0021) (.0021) (.0020)
43 Industry dummies X
60 Occupation dummies X
Industry × Occupation dummies X
B.3 Change in Log Wages
Figure 6 plots the average annual changes in log wages between booms and re-
cessions. I use March CPS 1976–2016 and recessions years are 1980-1983, 1990-
1992, 2001-2002 and 2008-2010. The figure shows a considerable difference in wage
growth rates between undergraduates and postgraduates. Undergraduates have a
larger wage growth rate than postgraduates in booms and a smaller (even nega-
tive) wage growth rate than postgraduates in recessions. The wage growth rates
for postgraduates are relatively more stable over the business cycle than those for
undergraduates.
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Figure 6: Change in log wages: Booms versus Recessions
C Model Appendix
C.1 Unique Search Market
The definition of equilibrium can be collapsed to the problem:
max
θˆhz ,EzVˆ
h
0z′
µ
(
θˆhz
)
Ez
(
Vˆ h0z′ − U
h
z′
)
(23)
s.t.
q
(
θˆhz
)
· βEzΠ
h
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
− ηh = 0
From the relationship between the probabilities of finding a job and filling a
vacancy (Equation 11), we have the job finding rate in a sub-market with tightness
θˆhz and promised value vˆ
h
z = EzVˆ
h
0z′ as follows:
µ
(
θˆhz
)
=

βEzΠh
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
ηh


α
1−α
(24)
Substitute it into (23), we have
max
θˆhz ,EzVˆ
h
0z′

βEzΠh
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
ηh


α
1−α
Ez
(
Vˆ h0z′ − U
h
z′
)
(25)
For any contract delivering a higher value to the worker, the market tightness
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must be lower for firms to break even in offering such a contract. The lower market
tightness makes the contract less attractive to workers because their job-finding
probability is lower. As the promised value for the worker rises, the declining job-
finding probability eventually begins to dominate the rising promised value, and a
unique optimal level of promised value balances these effects. Therefore, there is a
unique equilibrium search market for each (z, h).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let’s consider two distinct values of aggregate productivity z1 < z2. At z2, the firm
can adopt the optimal contract at z1, which is feasible and delivers the same value
V to the worker. As the transition matrix of z is assumed to be monotone,27 this
strategy generates a higher expected profit than Πh (s, z1, V ) – the pareto frontier
at z1. As this strategy has to be at most equal to Π
h (s, z2, V ) – the pareto frontier
at z2, we have that Π
h (s, z1, V ) < Π
h (s, z2, V ).
Similarly, when matched with an experienced worker (s = 1), the firm can adopt
the optimal contract when it is matched with a new hire (s = 0). This strategy
generates a higher expected profit than Πh (0, z, V ) – the pareto frontier when the
firm is matched with a new hire. As this strategy has to be at most equal to
Πh (1, z, V ) – the pareto frontier when the firm is matched with an experienced
worker, we have that Πh (0, z, V ) < Πh (1, z, V ).
C.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In the model, a higher level of specific capital is equivalent to a higher initial pro-
ductivity gap τ and a lower upgrading probability φ. Let’s consider two distinct
levels of specific capital ξ1 = (τ1, φ1) and ξ2 = (τ2, φ2). ξ2 represents a higher level
of specific capital comparing to ξ1, i.e. the initial productivity gap τ2 > τ1, and the
upgrading probability φ2 < φ1. From Equation (5), the firm’s value when match
with a new hire is
Πh (0, z, V ; ξi) = e (hz − τi)−w+e·βEz
[
φiΠ
h
(
1, z′, V h1z′
)
+ (1− φi)Π
h
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)]
27A transition matrix is called monotone if each row stochastically dominates the row above.
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At ξ1 (the lower level of specific capital), the firm can adopt the optimal con-
tract at ξ2, which is feasible and delivers the same value V to the new hire. As
Πh
(
1, z′, V h1z′
)
> Πh
(
0, z′, V h1z′
)
(Lemma 1), the firm’s expected profit next period
increases with φ. At the same time, because the flow output (hz − τ) decreases
with τ , this strategy generates a higher expected profit than Πh (0, z, V ; ξ2) – the
pareto frontier at ξ2. As this strategy has to be at most equal to Π
h (0, z, V ; ξ1) –
the pareto frontier at ξ1, we have that Π
h (0, z, V ; ξ2) < Π
h (0, z, V ; ξ1). As this is
true for all aggregate state, a higher amount of specific human capital reduces the
value of a new job.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 2, the value of a new job EzΠ
h
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
at ξ2 (the higher level of
specific capital) is smaller than that at ξ1 in every queue in the search market. From
Equation (24), the job finding rate in a sub-market with tightness θˆhz and promised
value vˆhz = EzVˆ
h
0z′ is an increasing function of EzΠ
h
(
0, z′, Vˆ h0z′
)
. Then, a higher
amount specific capital reduces a firm’s incentive to post vacancies, leading to a
decrease in the job finding rate in every sub-market. Thus, the unique equilibrium
search market for each (z, h) at ξ2 offers a lower worker’s value than that at ξ1.
Therefore, by Equation (15), the value of a worker’s outside options at ξ2 is lower
than that at at ξ1. By Equation (4), as the effort cost function is strictly increasing
and strictly convex, the optimal effort level of an experienced worker at ξ2 is lower
than that at ξ1. Finally, as the probability of a project’s success increases with the
level of effort, a higher amount of specific capital reduces job separation.
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